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LONG-TERM TRENDS
IN PUBLIC CONCERNS
IN TWO SOCIETIES(l)
RACHEL KATS
University of Haifa
ABSTRACT
Trends in public concerns from the early
1960's to the mid-1970's are compared for
Israel and the United States, relating changes
in concerns to historical and social change
which occurred during the decade in both so-
cieties. The analysis is based on open-ended
questions regarding views of either personal
or nation's future -- hopes and fears for that
future -- and a Self-Anchoring Rating Scale,
by which the respondent evaluated personal and
nation's situation in various time perspec-
tives. The Israeli's future perspective be-
came centered around peace and war, removing
other issues to a secondary plane of concern.
In contrast, the American became more concern-
ed about social issues. The most striking
difference in the evaluations of self and
society was that the Israelis revealed in the
seventies a personal depressive mood, while
the Americans were at that time more pessimis-
tic about their society's situation and fu-
ture.
The purpose of this paper is to compare
public concerns in two societies, Israel and
the United States, at two time periods, the
early 1960's and the mid-1970's. The basic
question asked is: How do different popula-
tions react, as evinced in their concerns, to
what happened in their lives and country over
the course of more than a decade?
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The idea of subjective concerns as moni-
tors of social change has recieved ample at-
tention (Land, 1971; Barnes and Inglehart,
1974; Parke and Seidman, 1978). A general
assumption has been that objective change
leads to change in subjective indicators
(Turner, 1971; Rokeach, 1973; Campbell, 1976);
or, following Weberian tradition, a mutual
relationship is postulated (Lipset, 1963).
As several authors have noted, compara-
tive studies combining a long-term and cross-
cultural perspective are less in evidence
(Pierce and Pride, 1972; Rokeach, 1973;
Campbell, 1976; Andrews and Inglehart, 1973).
This lack is due to, besides limitations of
resources, the difficulties involved in cap-
turing macro-social change -- its complexity,
extent, and duration, and its relation to the
change in individual attitudes (Kats, 1982).
In addition, a cross-sectional,cross-cultural
comparison introduces its own source of error
and bias: when patterns characterizing a na-
tion as a whole are overaccentuated, varia-
tions between relevant segments of the popula-
tion and their influence on those patterns may
be overlooked (Pierce and Pride, 1972; Rodgers
and Converse, 1975). Micro-level analysis, on
the other hand, may lead to ecological falla-
cies. Sampling errors and their effect on the
interpretation of results may be compounded in
cross-cultural research over time, since popu-
lations in different societies not only vary
as such, but may also change in divergent ways
(Duncan, 1975).
Nevertheless, as advocates of the cross-
cultural approach to the study of subjective
social indicators argue, only cross-cultural
research can adequately "reflect the recent
economic and social history" (Barnes and
Inglehart, 1974) and provide the proper per-
spective (Pierce and Pride, 1972). Phenomena
in different societal systems are comparable
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when the same operational measures are used --
provided these are valid -- and culture-bound
concepts can be distinguished adequately
(Andrews and Inglehart, 1979).
The subjective social indicators used in
the present study were developed by an adhe-
rent of the cross-cultural approach -- Hadley
Cantril -- and proved itself appropriate for
an overall comparison of public concerns in a
wide range of countries. Repeated use of Can-
tril's method in two focal countries offered
an opportunity to study and compare long-term
trends in concerns.(2)
The two societies selected for comparison
-- Israel and the United States -- are charac-
terized by both similarities and dissimilari-
ties.(3) Of major importance for the topic of
this paper is the fact that since the early
1960's, when relative calm seemed to prevail
in the world, both countries have gone through
"major national events" (Bradburn, 1969: 42)
-- war, economic upheaval, social turmoil --
which are likely to cause change in people's
concerns, otherwise affected mostly by their
more immediate personal life situation.
One of the major assumptions in the anal-
ysis of the Israeli data was that the rank
order of importance of concerns would remain
relatively stable over time (Antonovsky and
Arian, 1972; Rokeach, 1974; Kats, 1982); that
only the most salient public issues, those
related to major societal problems and change,
could be expected to change in accordance with
the objective trend (Turner, 1971). When the
assumption is extended to a cross-cultural
comparison, the hypothesis might be made that
the more stable concerns are basic human con-
cerns, which are similar in different socie-
ties, while the varying concerns reflect
changes in the societal system and in ideolo-
gies.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIXTIES
What were the major trends of change in
the two countries over this decade which are
considered to form a frame of reference a-
gainst which people's concerns were pat-
terned?(4)
Israel's _o1.ulation increased by about
50% from 1961 to 1974, relatively a much more
rapid increase than occurred during the same
period in the United States (about 15%). This
was due to a high rate of both natural in-
crease and immigration, and accompanied by a
rise in the Arab share of the population.
Emigration increased as well.
In both countries the decade was domi-
nated by war. In Israel, the wars of 1967
and 1973 added new dimensions -- occupied
territories, terrorism -- to already existing
defense problems, and they overshadowed other
international developments of importance. Op-
posite Israel's military power, there emerged
the economic and political power of the neigh-
boring Arab countries, the growing importance
of the PLO. America in the 1960's was domi-
nated by its involvement in Vietnam, which not
only had a traumatic impact internally, but
also changed the position of the United States
on the international scene. Shortly before the
second survey was conducted, the Middle East
crisis introduced the oil embargo and the
subsquent energy crisis.
Pitically in Israel, the decade of the
1960's has been characterized as one of "dyna-
mic conservatism" (Eisenstadt, 1977; Ellemers,
1981) with continuation of political leader-
ship and institutions. Yet it was a period in
which the national consensus seemed to erode:
rivalries and conflicts arose within parties;
new leadership emerged (Elazar, 1973). In
America, the political climate became one of
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increasing seeking equality in the Great So-
ciety, with descent into rioting and political
assassination (Watts and Free, 1978). Closer
to the second survey, the political corruption
of Watergate brought disillusionment, and
changed the relation of the people to its
leadership.
Although Israel remained economically far
behind the United States, which in the sixties
reached an unknown affluence and technological
development (Campbell, Con verse and Rodgers,
1976), its economy took large leaps ahead and
its standard of living increased according-
ly.(5) Except for 1965-67, unemployment re-
mained relatively low. At the same time the
inflation rate reached new proportions toward
the second survey and other economic problems
emer ged.(6) Material aspirations rose but
income gaps widened. In America, the steady
growth in affluence and welfare halted toward
the end of the sixties, and serious problems
of inflation and unemployment arose for parts
of the population.(7)
Soialy, the sixties were for Israel a
period of consolidation and further develop-
ment. But, more troublesome trends also ap-
peared; problems of the enviorment, crime, or
drugs were less widespread than in the United
States but felt more in the smaller country
(Greenberg, 1979). Questions of Jewish and
Israeli identity were brought into focus by
such events as the Eichmann trial and the
aftermath of the Arab wars (Antonovsky and
Arian, 1972; Eisenstadt, 1977). The pioneering
Zionist-Socialist ideology seemed on the re-
treat, repalced by a present-oriented, compe-
titive materialism and a self-confident belief
in Israel's power that was seriously challeng-
ed only by the October War. A declining work
ethic, combined with a deterioration in labor
relations, in interpersonal relations, and in
public morality, were other social trends
(Greenberg, 1979; Keren and Goldberg, 1980).
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The years brought increasing differentiation
and stratified pluralism to Israeli society,
notwithstanding the unifying effects of war.
The rising standard of living served not only
to create aspirations but to make inequalities
more sharply felt (Cohen, 1980; Deshen, 1980;
Smoohah and Peres, 1980). America in the
1960's experienced a decade of "civil rights
movement, social experimentation and criti-
cism" (Simon, 1974). Welfare programs and
revolutionary changes in the position of
groups such as blacks and women, proved to be
insufficient and created, as in Israel, dis-
content and frustration. These and other dis-
turbing and divisive social problems of the
post-industrial society, like alienation or
invasion of privacy, affected the self-image
of the American, as well as trust in the
leadership (Watts and Free, 1978; Abramowitz,
1980).
METHOD
The indicators employed in the study are
those developed in the early 1960's in an
international study by Hadley Camtril. In
order to measure subjective perceptions of the
"reality world," Cantril asked his respondents
two basic sets of questions. The first set
consisted of open-ended questions asking the
respondent to describe in as much detail as
possible his personal situyation and that of
his country in ideal circumstances.(8) Simi-
larly, he had to relate to the worst imagin-
able situation. In the second set, the respon-
dent was to consider the extreme situations he
had described as ends of an 11-point "ladder"
ranging from 10 to 0, the so-called "self-
Anchoring Striving Scale," and to rank self
and country on this scale. This ranking had to
be done for three points in time: five years
before the interview, at the time of the in-
terview, and five years in the future.(9)
Thus, feelings of optimism or pessimism, pro-
gress or frustration, were able to be mea-
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sured. (10)
The present analysis bases itself on data
from two Israeli and two American surveys
which used these two sets of questions. The
surveys in each country were conducted at
similar periods. In Israel a national survey
was conducted for Cantril by the Israel Insti-
tute of applied Social Research at the end of
1961 - beginning 1962 (Antonovsky and Arian,
1972). There were 1,170 respondents. At the
beginning of 1975, a replication of that study
was made among an urban sample of 531 persons.
This number corresponded with the 779 respon-
dents in the first sample who lived in the
same cities.(ll) The American data have been
reproduced from Watts and Free, State of the
Nation III, which reports on a seties of na-
tional surveys using Cantril's questions.(12)
For present purposes, data for 1964 and 1974
are compared; these are based on surveys con-
ducted, respectively, by the Institute for
International Social Research and Potomac
Associates.
Although the survey questions were trans-
lated into Hebrew for the Israeli studies, and
Israeli respondents mentioned some specific
topics, Cantril's original coding scheme was
generally applicable without arousing special
reliability problems. Intercoder reliability
at the two stages was, respectively, 95% and
84% (Antonovsky and Arian, 1972; Kats, 1982).
FINDINGS
Generally, the Israeli respondents re-
vealed a downward trend in the mentioning of
penal hopes: a more limited range of hopes
was mentioned, and the percentage expressing
each hope decreased.(13) "Immediate" issues
like standard of living, one's own health,
happy family life, and children's prospects,
remained highly ranked on the list, but the
dominant hope became the wish for peace. Ex-
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cept for the hope for a decrease in army
service -- extensive after the war period --
no new issue came to the fore (Table 1).
The personal hopes of the American gener-
ally increased; however, although the three
major aspirations of the 1960's -- standard of
living, children's future, and personal health
-- retained their primary importance, they
also declined in salience, as they did in
Israel. In fact, on these issues the personal
concerns of Israelis and Americans con-
verged.(14)
There is another difference between the
personal aspirations of Israelis and Ameri-
cans. The former concentrated on a happy fami-
ly life and on peace; the latter contended
with a new set of social issues: the hope for
economic stability, more honest government,
more social justice, less crime and violence,
and more international cooperation. These
issues, much less or not at all mentioned by
Israelis, probably reflect America's social
unrest, reactions to Watergate, and a concern
about the nation's position in the world.
Personal fears, too, were mentioned less
frequently by Israelis in 1975 than in 1962
(Table 2). Only war-related worries became
more salient: the fear of war, its specific
impact, terrorist attacks, and prolonged army
service. These concerns drove others deeper
into the background. Nevertheless, as with
hopes, the most salient of the personal ears
-- ill health and a lower standard of living
-- remained highest in rankorder after the
fear of war. The economic concerns of
Israelis received a different nuance: The
fear of economic instability became more pro-
nounced, a rather obvious consequent of the
inflation rate of theat time. Inflation
seemed to have affected the American more
immediately, however; for him it became a
mojor concern, ranking first with ill-health.
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Yet, despite large-scale unemployment in
America in the early 1970's personal fear of
unemployment of the American exhibited sta-
bility over the decade. Watts and Free (1978)
attributed this to the fact that unemployment
hit only specific groups in the population.
Reflecting personal hopes, social issues
became more prominent in the personal fears of
Americans. In Israel these issues were men-
tioned by very few. Only in the two major
fears of ill health and decline in the stand-
ard of living did the Israeli resemble the
American in the mid-seventies. As for other
personal ears, the percentages in 1975 were
even lower for Israelis than for Americans, a
reversal of the 1962 situation, when Israelis
expressed more fears.
The greatest contrast between Israel and
the United States was in national hopes: a
drastic reduction in Israel; an increase in
the United States (Table 3).
Peace (in Israel, usually meaning peace
with the Arab countries) remained the foremost
national hope of the majority of Israelis. In
the States, peace was also the highest ranking
issue; but it declined in importance from 51%
to 27% and, despite Vietnam, was of much less
national salience than it was in Israel. This
Israeli concern for peace removed most of the
national issues from the mind, as it did on
the personal level, except for the hope for a
higher standard of living. The latter and the
hope for economic stability replaced a concern
for productivity and technological advance,
which had been prominent issues in Israel in
the early sixties. Furthermore, only some
concern about immigration, public morality,
and national unity retained their salience
among Israelis. The first indicated perhaps a
worry about the decline in immigration; The
last seemed to reflect discontent and doubts
of the period after the October War.
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In the United States peace and a higher
standard of living ranked in 1964 as high in
importance as they did in Israel. These two
concerns were followed in rankorder by the
hope for employment and the elimination of
discrimination, issues of relevance at the
time. In 1974, when the Vietnam war had
ended, as had Watergate, the American had
become more preoccupied with domestic issues.
Not only did integrity in politics and infla-
tion rank highest among national hopes, but
generally -- in contrast to Israel -- social
issues gained in salience: social responsi-
bility, efficiency in government, law and
order, democracy in government, public health,
ecology. The American clearly held more as-
pirations for his society than did the
Israeli, who wanted above all to be left in
peace.
Although the October War had somehow
lowered the expectation among Israelis that a
new war would erupt soon -- the fear of war
with the Arabs decreased from 50% to 8% -- it
left at least two immediate national fears:
of the destruction of the State (mentioned by
17%) and the burden of continuing army ser-
vice. Otherwise only the two economic issues,
of inflation and an inadequate standard of
living, retained a certain salience as nation
fear. No further internal issues seemed of
importance to the Israeli public (Table 4).
The American pattern bears witness to the
internal troubles and the energy crisis that
the United States as a whole had experienced
by the second survey. War, which in 1964 was
of major importance as in Israel, now ranked
only second after the economic worry of infla-
tion. The Cold War had ended; fear of comm-
unism, second in importance in 1964, lost most
of its salience. Reflecting national hopes
and in contrast to Israel, the worry over
internal political and social conditions, even
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though mentioned by a minority, has increased
or, at least, not declined in salience.
The reflection of these trends in con-
cerns from the mid-sixties to the mid-seven-
ties in the average ladder ratings -- the
views of past, present and future of self and
nation -- shows the differences in outlook
between the Israeli and the American in yet
another way (Table 5 and Figure 1).
Both personal and national ladder ratings
in the early sixties showed an upward trend
over time: the present was considered better
than the past, and expectations were even
higher for the future. Generally, the ratings
for Israelis on both ladders, were below the
level of those for Americans. On the personal
level, the slope from past to future was some-
what more even for Americans than for
Israelis. In the national ratings, Israelis
revealed a stronger optimism: the slope for
Israelis was straightlined and steeper than
for Americans. Israelis in the early 1960's,
then, viewed their past -- perhaps realistic-
ally so -- relatively low compared to Ameri-
cans; but having experienced rapid progress
toward the present, they tended to project
this evaluation onto an optimistic view of the
future, in which, potentially, much could
still be realized (Antonovsky and Arian,
1972). The Israeli respondents tended to view
their personal past in a better light than
that of their country, and the present about
the same; but the national future looked
rosier than their own. For the Americans, the
opposite was true: they considered their own
past worse off than their country's, but both
their personal present and future better off.
The mid-seventies see a turn in the tide.
The mood in Israel had become depressed; in
particular, the personal present was seen as
more negative than in the past. Hope in the
future was not lost; people still expected
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imporvement, personally and nationally. On
the personal level, however, their future
aspirations were lower than in 1962. Remark-
able enough, the national present was ranked
about the same as in the past. Regarding the
national future, the Israelis remained as
optimistic in 1975 as they were in 1962.
The personal ratings of Americans in 1974
followed parallel trends to those in 1964,
only at a lower level. Americans showed no
drop in their evaluation of the present as had
the Israelis. For the Americans, that hap-
pened nationally: the present was clearly
evaluated lower than in the past; but, al-
though the future was again rated higher, the
level of 1974 fell under that of 1964. Na-
tional present and future, in contrast to the
sixties, were also ranked far below personal
present and future.
Finally, comparing the Israeli of the
mid-seventies with the American of that per-
iod: the former saw his personal present and
future clearly at a lower level. The Amer-
ican, by contrast, ranked his nation's pre-
sent, and even more so its future, lower. The
American had become as pessimistic about the
present and future of the nation as the
Israeli had become about personal life. (16)
DISCUSSION
Public opinion is difficult to link di-
rectly and causally to events. Yet the re-
sults of the surveys in both countries, as
well as to some of the asic trends which
developed in their economic, political an
social life. This response is revealed most
clearly in the changing patterns of concerns
of major salience. Of course, answers to
open-ended questions, in particular, tend to
follow normative issues of concern, the "head-
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lines."
Such possible bias in the data, however,
does not explain all of the difference between
the two countries. A variety of generalized
characteristics o the Israelis have been ad-
vanced to explain why they remained occupied
with the down-to-earth daily problems of per-
sonal health, family, and economic situation
and seemingly left unattended many social
issues that one might have expected to bother
them. These characteristics, which existed in
1962, but seemingly became more prominent in
1975, included complacency, narrowness of
scope, provincialism, and lack of social con-
sciousness or responsibility (Antonovsky and
Arian, 1972: Eisenstadt, 197,; Greenberg,
1979). It has also been suggested that these
attitudes may reflect a defensive or hardening
reaction, a way of coping with the stresses
under which the Israeli constantly lives
(Rokeach, 1973); or, that the Israelis concen-
trate on the basic concernns because the prob-
lems of their country are too large and com-
plex to comprehend, and as such are for the
government to come to grips with, not for
them.
The difference with the Israelis on this
plane can be exaggerated; however, the Ameri-
cans show themselves in this and other studies
to be relatively more socially concerned.
This is seen as being due to their more activ-
ist, participatory orientation, to a confi-
dence in their ability and responsibility to
influence and change their government and
environment, and to a tendency to criticize
(Abramowitz, 1980).
If the personal optimism of the American
can be understood by a generally adequate life
situation, despite problems (Watts and Free,
1978), then the national optimism of the
Israeli, given the situation in 1974, raises
more questions than does the personal pessi-
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mism. Does the national optimism express
loyalty to country -- not allowing the
Israelis mentally to be as pessimistic as they
are about their personal life? Or is a tradi-
tional Jewish cultural trait being expressed
here: hope for better times, which remained
alive throughout the centuries, not for the
person, but for the people?
The Israelis' national image, central
symbol of identity, and their aspirations,
have always been extended to utopian dimen-
sions in order to enable them to live in a
world of uncertainty (Jacob, 1974; Eisenstadt,
1977; Greenberg, 1979). The symbol is related
to a belief in the impossible, the miracle.
The Israelis can imagine many bad things to
happen to them personaly, but they cannot
aford to be doubtful about their country, the
only thing which keeps them standing in a
hostile world. Being doubtful for the Israeli
does not mean doubting the things the American
does; it means fear for the existence of
Israel itself. The Americans may have been
shocked by objective occurrences; but despite
the manifestation and extent of economic and
social problems, their basic existence was not
felt threatened, the way it was for the
Israelis. Thus the Americans may seem gloomy
when asked about their country; personally,
though, not too much has changed.
At the outset of this paper, it was pos-
tulated that, in both the United States and
Israel, socially responsive concerns would
change according to the social change exper-
ienced, while more general human concerns
would remain more nearly constant. The data
revealed a complex esponse, in both the chang-
ing salience of concerns and the personal and
national evaluation of reality. On some
issues, Israelis seem to have progressed along
the line of development suggested by Cantril
(1965), their concerns converging toward those
in the more mature American society, which has
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reached a stage of questioning the achieved.
Otherwise, events and developments seem to
have led to some directional change, partially
confirming the general hypothesis. Though
differently expressed, each country displayed
a mood of depression at the time of the 1970's
surveys.
The years since then have brought a dras-
tic change in the political constellation of
both countries, a new war. The extent to
which these and other changes are a conse-
quence of the concerns expressed, and possibly
are remolding the public's hopes and fears, is
a topic for further research.
NOTES
(1) This study was sponsored by a grant from
the Israel National Academy of Sciences. Add-
itional support was received from the School
of Social Work, University of Haifa. I grate-
fully acknowledge the helpful comments of A.
Antonovsky, H. Chaiklin, A. Goldstein and J.
Shuval. Special thanks are due to A.
Antonovsky, A. Arian and the Israel Institute
of Applied Social Research for the opportunity
to use data from their 1962 survey; and to
Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company,
Lexington, Mass., for its permission to re-
print data from W. Watts and L. A. Free. State
of the Nation III, 1978.
2) For analyses of trends in public con-
cerns in each country, see, for example, for
Israel: Antonovsky and Arian, 1972; Jacob,
1974; Greenberg, 1979; Kats, 1982; for the
United States: Simon, 1974; Campbell, Converse
and Rodgers, 1976; Watts and Free, 1978.
3) Spechler (1980) argues that a vast coun-
try like the united states, with abundant
human and natural resources, cannot be com-
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pared with a small, isolated country that
lacks these assets. Cantril (1965) thought of
the United States as a well-developed, mature
society, while Israel was on its way to be-
coming a Western-modelled society, "headed in
the same direction but at a slower pace"
(Greenberg, 1979). In the Latter's view the
United States form a major model for Israel,
and Israelis tend to stress similarity in
problems and values.
4) Cantril (1965: 43) classified the United
States in the early sixties as a well-deve-
loped, industrialized society, with an
unequalled standard of living and further
expansion in health, education and culture.
Israel, at the time he considered as having a
high standard of living, rapidly developing
further. For recent reviews on developments,
see, on Israel: Greenberg, 1979; Keren and
Goldberg, 1980; Spechler, 1980; on America:
Watts and Free, 1978; Abromowitz, 1980.
5) Unitl 1973 the Gross domestic Product
growth rate was high compared to other indus-
trialized countries, including the U.S.A.
Private consumption showed an 8.7% annual
increase (Antonovsky and Arian, 1972).
6) After 1973 the increase in GDP dropped.
Labor costs as well as government expenditure
increased, the balance of international cur-
rency was negative (Spechler, 1980).
7) In 1974 the per capita Gross National
Product declined for the first time, inflation
reached 22%, the dollar was devaluated, and
milliions of people faced unemployment (Watts
and Free, 1978). The Israeli's real income
may have lagged behind that of the American
worker, but he still enjoyed employment secur-
ity and a range of social benefits. In con-
trast to the United States, family life re-
mained "stable and intensive" Greenberg, 1979:
77).
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8) Sample question: "All of us want cer-
tain things out of life. When you think about
what really matters in your own life, what are
your wishes and hopes for the future? In
other words, if you imagine your future in the
best possible light, what would your life look
like the, if your are to be happy?"
9) Sample question: "here is a picture o a
ladder, Suppose we say that the top of the
ladder represents the best possible life for
you and the bottome represents the worst pos-
sible life for you; where on the ladder do you
feel you personally stand at the present
time?"
10) Though criticism has been raised about
the validity and reliablility of these ques-
tions, they have proven to be sensitive indi-
cators of concerns that are of general sali-
ence for the public, and as such they have
been used repeatedly (Watts and Free, 1978;
Kats, 1982).
11) The first was a multi-stage nation
sample of jewish citizens, aged 18 and over,
drawn from the voting register; the 1975 study
was a systematic random sample, drawn from
postal zipcode lists and based on sampling
within householdunits of jewish citizens aged
20 and over. The second sample had slightly
younger, more Israeli born, and higher edu-
cated respondents, reflecting population
changes, but was otherwise comparable.
12) Data regarding sample size in the
American surveys could not be obtained.
Usually national samples reanged between 1100
and 1600.
13) Generally, in 1962 the Israel had on the
average "many more things to say' than did the
American (Anntonovsky and Arian, 1972: 13),
236
and was more hopeful -- a function of national
hopes. Though differences in coding opera-
tions were not excluded, the authors offered
three other explanation: the verboseness of
the Israeli people, the plethora of events
experienced by the young nation, and a stron-
ger identification by the Israeli with the
nation than by the American. By 1974-75 the
concerns of the Israeli had become more
limited, in both volume and range, whereas
those of the American had increased to the
extent that they now exceeded somewhat those
of the Israeli. A partial explanation may be
that in Israel in 1975, the pertinent ques-
tions were part of a larger omnibus survey,
which may have suppressed details in the an-
swers. The changing picture, however, seems
rather to be a function of less optimistic
views held by the Israelis in 1975. Though
Israeli respondents still expressed more hopes
than fears, these hopes had been reduced in
scope. In contrast, Americans mentioned more
hopes than they earlier.
14) Watts and Free (1978; 173) explain the
decline in importance of a higher standard of
living by a partial fulfillment of aspira-
tions, yet a repressin of hope through failure
to advance. The decrease in concerns for
family and children is attributed to frustra-
tions over the young.
15) A reason for this may be that Israeli
government policy has kept unemployment at a
low rate and at the same time has adjusted
wages to tthe pace of inflation. Neither is
the case in America.
16) As later surveys revealed (Watts and
Free, 1978: 206), this national ebb in
America was not a passing mood.
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Table 1.
Personal Hopes, Israel and U.S.A., by Period
(Percentage mentioning topic)*
Israel U.S.A.
1961975 1964 1974Topic Mentioned N =(779) (531)
Aspirations for
children
Higher or decent stan-
dard of living
Personal health
House, apartment
General concerns for
family, relatives
Family health
Leisure, recreation,
travel
Happy family life
Good job, congenial
work
Modern conveniences
Employment
Peace
Self-improvement
Having own business
Freedom from debt
Being a normal,decent
person
Job providing self-
development
Happy old age
Success in one's work
Peace of mind,
emotional maturity
Having wealth
Economic stability,
no inflation
Less army service
Better world, inter-
national cooperation
48 % 19 % 35 % 24 %
**
** 7
** 5
** 15
** ** ** 8
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Table 1. (cont)
Better, more honest
government/politics
Social justice,
elimination of dis-
crimination
Safety from crime and
violence
Personal ethical/
religious problems
Christian revival
- - ** 10
- - ** 7
- - ** 6
- - 6 5
- - ** 5
* The Israeli data for 1962 are based on an
urban subsample, comparable to the 1975 urban
sample; source: Israel Institue of Applied
Social Research. Tables from Dats (1982) are
reprinted with permission of Tavistock Publi-
cations. The data for the U.S.A.are based on
national samples; source: Institute for
International Social Research, 1964; Potomac
Associates, 1974; and reprinted, from Watts
and Free (1978), with permission of Lexington
Books, D.C. Heath and Company. For the
Israeli data a difference of at least 9% be-
tween periods was statistically significant
(difference between proportions).
** Mentioned by less than five per cent.
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Table 2.
Personal Fears, Israel and U.S.A., by Period
(Percentage mentioning topic)
--------------------------------------
19621975 1964 1974
Topic Mentioned N = (779) (531)
----------------------------------------
Personal ill-health
Lower, inadequate
standard of living
Ill-health family
War
Dependence on others,
old age, loneliness
Unemployment
Children (inadequate
opportunities)
General concerns for,
family, relatives
Unhappy family life
Uncongenial work
Economic instability,
inflation
Specific impact of war,
terrorism
Army service
Social decay, moral
disintegration
Lack of freedom (of
speech)
Lack of integrity in
government/politics
Crime
42 % 20 % 25 % 25
14 * 10 10
* 9 * 26
S 8 -
- 6 " -
* *
* *
* 9
6 6
- * * 5
- - * 9
* Mentioned by less than five per cent.
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Table 3.
National Hopes, Israel and U.S.A., by Period
(Percentage mentioning topic)
Israel U.S.A.
1962 1975 1964 1974Topic Mentioned N =(779) (531)
Peace
Productivity, tech-
nological advance
Population, immi-
gration
Decent, higher
standard of living
Economic stability,
no inflation
National independence,
economic self-
sufficiency
Increased exports
Political stability,
national unity
Military strength
Employment
Change in electoral
system
Elimination of
discrimination
General education
Cultural standards
Public morality
Adequate housing
Free secondary
education
Status of nation
International co-
operation, better
world
Social responsibility,
common good
74 % 72 % 51% 27 %
48 7 - -
36 12 - -
33 23 28 11
19 15 5 24
81* 6
11 *
6 *
* 5
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Table 3. (cont)
Interpersonal relations *
Efficient government *
Integrity in
government/politics *
Law and order *
More democratic,
representative govern-
ment •
Public health *
Improved ecology
Change of presidents
* Mentioned by less than five per cent
Table 4.
National Fears, Israel and U.S.A., by Perio
(Percentage mentioning topic)
Israel U.S.A.
1962 1975 196419
Topic Mentioned N = (779) (531)
War 80 % 46 % 50 % 24
Lower, inadequate
standard of living
Economic instability,
inflation
Political instability,
national disunity
Increased taxes
Population, lack of
immigration
Low productivity
Unemployment
Materialism
Army service
17 14 * 6
15 13 28
6 *
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* 11
* 25
* 1i
* 5
* 5
* 5
* 12
Table 4. (cont)
Lack of public
morality
Dishonesty in
government/politics
Loss of democratic
government
Inefficient government
Destruction of state
Too centralized,
powerful government
Threat of communist
power
Lack of law and order
Pollution
Food shortages
* 5 6 6
* *
* *
* 8
* 5
- - 7 5
- - 5 13
- - * 6
- - * 6
* Mentioned by less than five per cent.
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Table 5.
Mean Ladder Ratings, Israel and U.S.A.
by Period *
-------------------------------------------------
Past Present
to to
Past Present Future Present Future
-----------------------------------------
Israel 1962 4.8
1975 5.7
U.S.A. 1964 6.0
1974 5.5
5.5 7.0
4.8 5.6
6.9 7.9
6.6 7.4
+0.7 +1.5**
-0.9 +0.8
+0.9 +1.0
+1.1 +0.8
National
Israel 1962 4.0
1975 5.7
U.S.A. 1964 6.1
1974 6.3
5.6 7.5
5.6 7.5
6.5 7.7
4.8 5.8
+1.6 +1.9
-0.1 +1.9
+0.5 +1.2
-1.5 +1.0
* Based on the Self Anchoring Scale
** A difference of 1.0 in a rating was
considered statistically significant for the
Israeli data (difference between means, Kats,
1982), of 0.6 for the American data (Watts and
Free, 1978)
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Figure 1.
Trends in mean ladder ratings, 1960's and
1970's, Israel and U.S.A.
(Sources: Institute for International Social
Research, 1964; Potomac Associates, 1974:
Israel Institute of Applied Social Research,
1962, 1975)
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Figure 1. (cont)
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